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DEFENDING THE "OTHER" FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM: STATE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE
LAWS AND THE FREE EXERCISE
OF RELIGION
Meghan E. Sweeney*
[T]hose who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not
know what religion means.
Mohandas K. Gandhi'
INTRODUCTION
Five church members meet on a Saturday afternoon in their
church basement to make fliers for distribution at Sunday services.
These fliers speak out against a proposed state bill legalizing same-sex
marriage. The group uses its own supplies, including paper, but
makes copies on the church's copy machine. Should the church
members have to fill out paperwork and register with the state as a
political committee for this activity? Would they even know about the
state laws requiring them to register? Should the church be required
to pay a fine if the group fails to do so? The debate about the proper
place of religious organizations in American politics is not a new one.
In past court cases, most institutional plaintiffs claim violations of
their free speech and free exercise rights, but courts have traditionally
examined campaign registration and disclosure laws based only on
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Political
Science and History, University of Notre Dame, 2008. Special thanks to Professors
Richard W. Garnett and Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer for their guidance during the Note
writing process and to Dale M. Schowengerdt from the Alliance Defense Fund and
Philip Allen Lacovara for their invaluable assistance with my research. Thank you also
to my parents, Dr. Patrick and Eileen Sweeney, for their unconditional love and
support, and to the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions
and diligence in editing.
1 MOHANDAS K GANDHI, AN AtrrOBIOGRAPHY 454 (Mahadev Desai trans., Dover
Publ'ns, Inc. 1983) (1927).
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the institution's right to free speech.2 But in the recent Ninth Circuit
case Canyon Feny Road Baptist Church of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth,3
Judge Noonan addressed the effect of Montana's campaign disclosure
law on the free exercise rights of a Baptist church in his concurrence.4
Judge Noonan questioned whether the law was actually "neutral and
generally applicable" as required by Employment Division v. Smith5 to
avoid strict scrutiny review due to exemptions from the registration
and disclosure laws granted to media organizations.6 Judge Noonan's
concurrence suggests that even in a post-Smith world there is room to
argue that state campaign laws requiring religious institutions to regis-
ter with the state before speaking out on a ballot measure or piece of
legislation violate the right of free exercise guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.7
To highlight the problem, this Note begins in Part I by discussing
two recent examples of conflict between religious institutions and the
government specifically dealing with churches that failed to register as
a political committee or lobbyist under their state campaign laws. Part
1I gives a brief history of the free exercise case law through the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Part III considers two ways to
attack campaign registration and disclosure laws on free exercise
grounds even after Smith. This Part both considers whether religious
organizations have a right to institutional free exercise protection and
examines whether these laws are truly neutral and generally applica-
ble given the exemptions they grant to media organizations. Part IV
examines whether these laws serve a compelling state interest that
would allow them to survive a strict scrutiny analysis even if brought
outside of Smith protection. Finally, this Note concludes that state
campaign registration and disclosure laws requiring religious institu-
2 See, e.g., Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556
F.3d 1021, 1028 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Our disposition of the vagueness and free
speech issues makes it unnecessary for us to address the Church's additional chal-
lenges based on First Amendment rights of association and free exercise of relig-
ion."); Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tenn. 1987) ("[W]e
think that the sole determinative issue is whether the Act violates the free speech
clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We find it
unnecessary to address the other issues to resolve this case.").
3 556 F.3d 1021.
4 See id. at 1035 (Noonan, J., concurring).
5 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Smith case will be covered in greater detail infra Part
II.B.
6 See Unsworth, 556 F.3d at 1035 (NoonanJ., concurring). For further discussion
of the press exemption and its effects on the general applicability of the Montana law,
see infra Part III.B.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tions to register as political committees or lobbyists when speaking out
on a ballot initiative or piece of legislation and not directly supporting
a candidate for office violate the free exercise rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.8
I. MODERN EXAMPLES OF CHURCH/STATE CONFLICT
The failure to properly abide by state campaign disclosure laws
when supporting or opposing a ballot initiative or bill can lead to
costly litigation and hefty fines for churches. Even more troubling,
however, is the potential for discretionary enforcement and the use of
state disclosure laws to punish political adversaries. Due to religious
organizations' engagement in hot-button political issues, they are
likely targets for this discretionary and politically motivated enforce-
ment. Two recent cases illustrate the potential costs to religious orga-
nizations who fail to disclose activities that the states consider political
involvement.
A. Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, Connecticut
In January 2009, the Connecticut General Assembly proposed Bill
No. 1098 entitled An Act Modifying Corporate Laws Relating to Cer-
8 Although the controversial "hybrid rights" doctrine applies strict scrutiny to
cases where both free exercise and another constitutional right are implicated, this
doctrine goes beyond the scope of this Note. For cases applying the hybrid rights
doctrine, however, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating a Wis-
consin mandatory education law as applied to Amish students); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a tax on solicitation as applied to the
dissemination of religious ideas); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (inval-
idating a licensing scheme for solicitation that allowed too much individual discretion
by the administrator). For judicial criticism of the "hybrid rights" doctrine, see
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566-67 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part) (describing Smith's "hybrid" rights distinction as "ultimately
untenable"); Smith, 494 U.S. at 895-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Court
endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them
'hybrid' decisions, but there is no denying that both cases expressly relied on the Free
Exercise Clause and that we have consistently regarded those cases as part of the
mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence." (citations omitted)). I will instead
argue that state campaign disclosure laws should fail under a strict scrutiny analysis
regardless of their implications for free speech or free association because of their
flagrant violation of free exercise rights. But see Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (noting that the
invalidation of neutral and generally applicable laws for religious reasons only
occurred when "the Free Exercise Clause [was] in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press or the rights of parents
to direct the education of their children" (citations omitted)).
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tain Religious Corporations.9 The stated purpose of the bill was to
"revise the corporate governance provisions applicable to the Roman
Catholic Church and provide for the investigation of the misappropri-
ation of funds by religious corporations." 0 The bill, if enacted, would
have reorganized the legal, financial, and administrative structure of
parishes by requiring lay boards to run parishes "effectively
exclud[ing]" pastors and bishops from church governance." Accord-
ing to Bishop William E. Lori of the Diocese of Bridgeport, however,
the bill was a "thinly-veiled attempt to silence the Church on the
important Catholic issues of the day, such as same-sex marriage."' 2 In
a diocesan statement, Bishop Lori encouraged Catholics to call and
email their state senators and to come to Hartford in March of 2009 to
protest at the public hearing on the bill.' 3 The diocese succeeded in
busing over a thousand people to the state capitol for a rally against
the bill, although the legislature withdrew the bill the evening before
the rally. 1 4 The Office of State Ethics notified the diocese six weeks
later that it was under investigation for failing to register as a lobbyist
before busing Catholics to the rally'5 and before opposing a bill
regarding same-sex marriage on the diocesan website.' 6 According to
9 S.B. 1098, 2009 Gen. Assemb.,Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at http://www.
cga.ct.gov/2009/TOB/S/2009SB-01098-R00-SB.htm.
10 Id.
11 Diocesan Statement on Proposed Legislative Bill # 1098 from Rev. William E.




14 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 4, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, No. 2009-cv-00851 (D.
Conn. 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
15 See Daniel Tepfer, Diocese Files Suit over Right to Protest, CONN. POST, May 30,
2009, at Al (quoting a letter from the state ethics enforcement officer to the diocese
stating "[t]his evaluation is being conducted to ascertain whether the Catholic Dio-
cese of Bridgeport violated [state law] by failing to register as a lobbyist in Connecti-
cut, by failing to submit all other appropriate lobbyist filings and by failing to follow
all applicable registration procedures"); Christine Stuart, Catholic Church Sues State over
Lobbying Provision, CT NEWS JUNKIE, May 29, 2009, http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/
courts/catholic churchsuesstateove.php (explaining the background of the suit).
16 See Pulpit Announcement from the Diocese of Bridgeport (April 19,
2009), available at http://www.bridgeportdiocese.com/folder-bridgedocs/Pulpit
Announcements[1].pdf (urging Catholics to contact their state legislators and ask
them to vote "no" on Senate Bill 899 legalizing same-sex marriage); Diocese Responds
to "Civil Union" Legislation, DIOCESE OF BRIDGEPORT (April 14, 2005), http://www.
bridgeportdiocese.com/story-civil3.shtml (urging Catholics to contact legislators
voicing opposition to civil union legislation). See generally Your Help Is Needed Now to
Defeat Senate Bill 899, DIOCESE OF BRIDGEPORT, http://www.bridgeportdiocese.com/
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the ethics office, the diocese was required to register as a lobbyist if its
expenditures "in connection with the Rally and/or the website state-
ments were $2000 or more."17 The diocese filed suit against Thomas
Jones and Carol Carson, ethics enforcement officers for the state of
Connecticut, claiming that the registration requirements were "chil-
ling [the Diocese's] constitutional rights" because the Catholic faith
"compels [Catholics] to take stands on the moral issues of the day,
which, from time to time, are embedded in legislation." 8
Although the state Ethics Office eventually dropped the case after
the Attorney General resolved not to defend Connecticut in the case
due to "serious and significant potential chilling effects on protected
First Amendment, free expression rights,"19 the Attorney General
failed to discuss the potential free exercise implications of the suit as
raised by the diocese in its briefs.
B. Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church: East Helena, Montana
In the spring of 2004, the pastor of a small Montana Baptist
church decided to involve his congregation in supporting Constitu-
tional Initiative No. 96 (CI-96) in an attempt to place it on the ballot
the following November. 20 CI-96 proposed to amend the Montana
Constitution to define marriage "as a union between one man and
one woman."21 Terri Paske, a church member at Canyon Ferry Road
Baptist Church, printed out a template petition supporting CI-96 from
a website and made less than fifty copies on the Church's copy
machine using her own paper.22 With the pastor's approval, she
placed about twenty copies of the petition in the church's foyer.23
Around the same time, Pastor Stumberg made plans for a simulcast
Fight_899.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (including documents explaining the posi-
tion of the Catholic church on same-sex marriage and phone numbers of legislators
to call in order to oppose the bill).
17 See Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 7. Two thousand dollars is the
statutory threshold for lobbying registration in Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-94
(2009).
18 Complaint at 6, Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, No. 2009-
cv-00851 (D. Conn. 2009).
19 Christine Stuart, Blumenthal Sides with Catholic Church, CT NEWS JUNKIE (June
30, 2009), http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/legal/blumenthal-sideswith-catholic.php.
20 See Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d
1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). For the text of CI-96 and arguments for and against
enactment, see BOB BROWN, 2004 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 22-25 (2004), avail-
able at http://sos.mt.gov/Elections/archives/2000s/2004/2004-VIP.pdf.
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entitled Battle for Marriage to air at a regularly scheduled church ser-
vice on May 23, 2004.24 This presentation featured various religious
leaders speaking out on the topic of marriage and discussed a possible
amendment to the U.S. Constitution defining marriage as between
one man and one woman; however, the program did not mention any
issue or candidate specific to Montana.25 The church advertised the
screening through unpaid public service announcements on the radio
and by passing out flyers that did not specifically mention CI-96.26
Ninety-three people attended the service on May 23 and after the
broadcast, Pastor Stumberg spoke briefly to the congregation about
CI-96 and told everyone that they "need [ed] to sign" the petition.27 A
week later, the petitions circulated during Sunday services and they
remained in the church foyer until June 13.28 ByJune 13, there were
ninety-eight signatures on the petitions, and Paske had them nota-
rized and sent to the appropriate county officials.29
On May 26, 2004, an activist group called Montanans for Families
and Fairness filed a campaign finance and practices complaint against
the church alleging that they had created an "incidental political com-
mittee" in connection with the May 23 service and had failed to file
disclosure forms for expenditures.3 0  Incidental committees are
required to follow Montana campaign finance and disclosure laws and




27 Id. at 1025. Pastor Stumberg also told his congregation that "[t]his is one of
the ways that we take a stand for righteousness." Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. Ninety-two of the signatures on the petitions were from church members.
CI-96 gained enough support to be placed on the ballot in November and it passed by
a margin of 66.5% to 33.5%. Id.
30 Id.; see also Summary of Facts and Statement of Findings at 6, In the Matter of
the Complaint Against the Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church (Comm'r of Political
Practices Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Summary of Facts], available at http://politicalprac-
tices.mt.gov/content/pdf/2recentdecisionsl-ethics/canyonferrycfpl.pdf (alleging
that the church became an incidental political committee based on its activity).
According to the Administrative Rules of Montana, an "incidental political commit-
tee" is "a political committee that is not specifically organized or maintained for the
primary purpose of influencing elections but that may incidentally become a political
committee by making a contribution or expenditure to support or oppose a candi-
date and/or issue." MoNr. ADMIN. R. 44.10.327(2) (c) (2009).
31 See Summary of Facts, supra note 30, at 10. Under the Montana Administrative
Rules, incidental political committees must file a statement of organization, including
the name and address of its treasurer and any other officers within five days of making
or authorizing an expenditure on the committee's behalf. See Mor. CODE ANN. § 13-
2038 [VOL. 85:5
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from Pastor Stumberg, and petition signings occurred in church facili-
ties during regularly scheduled Church services, and because there
were costs involved in running the church service, the church violated
the campaign finance laws for failure to disclose these expenses.32
Failing to abide by Montana disclosure laws may result in the initiation
of civil or criminal actions.3 3
The church and Pastor Stumberg filed suit against the Montana
Commissioner of Political Practices under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stating
that their rights to free speech, free association, and free exercise
were compromised by the state of Montana.3 4 The District Court
ruled in favor of the State and granted summary judgment, and the
plaintiffs appealed.3 5 In their appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the
reporting requirements violated their rights to free speech, free asso-
ciation, and free exercise.36 They also claimed that the campaign stat-
utes are unconstitutionally vague because they have "no clear
[monetary] trigger" to warn Montana citizens about when registration
is necessary.37 Although the appellants briefed free exercise chal-
lenges to the laws,38 the Court ruled in their favor based on free
speech issues and declined to address the free exercise issues in the
37-201 (2009); MONT. ADmIN. R. 44.10.411. They must also file periodic reports set
forth in a schedule in the Montana Administrative Rules including quarterly reports,
year-end reports, and other periodic reports near election time. See MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 13-37-226; MoNT. ADMIN. R. 44.10.411. Finally, they must disclose every contri-
bution that is "earmarked" for a specific ballot issue. See MONT. ADMIN. R.
44.10.411(5); id. R. 44.10.519 ("For the purposes of [§] 13-37-217, MCA, and these
rules, an 'earmarked contribution' is a contribution made with the direction, express
or implied, that all or part of it be transferred to or expended on behalf of a specified
candidate, ballot issue, or petition for nomination."); see also Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist
Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Higgins, CV 04-24-H-DWM, 2006 WL 6196415, at *3-4
(D. Mont. Sept. 26, 2006) (explaining the regulations for incidental political commit-
tees under Montana law), rev'd, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).
32 Some of the expenses involved included: the salary of Pastor Stumberg, build-
ing payments, utility costs, and cleaning charges. See Plaintiffs Summary of Facts,
supra note 30, at 1.
33 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-121(3) (4).
34 Higgins, 2006 WL 6196415, at *2.
35 See id. at *17.
36 Appellants' Opening Brief at 3-5, Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E.
Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-35883).
37 Id. at 17-18.
38 See id. at 52-55; Appellants' Reply Brief at 29-32, Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (No.
06-35883); Brief for Nat'l Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants at 1-19, Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (No. 06-35883) [hereinafter Nat'l Legal Found.
Brief].
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majority opinion.39 Judge Noonan, however, stated that the campaign
regulations were also unconstitutional in light of the Free Exercise
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.40
These two examples show the potential problems arising from
state campaign laws that unnecessarily burden religious institutions
attempting to adhere to the tenets of their religions. In order to
understand how to circumvent these burdensome laws, however, it is
necessary to have a basic understanding of free exercise jurispru-
dence. Part II gives a brief history of this case law.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The religion clauses in the First Amendment of the Constitution
state, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."41 These
clauses-referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause-work in tension to both protect religious belief and pre-
vent the government from establishing a national religion. Scholars
and jurists have attempted to walk a line between the clauses that
becomes harder to navigate as time passes.42 Justice Rehnquist cites
three reasons for the growth of this "tension" between the clauses in
his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana43 : first, the growth of
social welfare legislation, second, the incorporation of the First
Amendment, and third, the overly expansive interpretation of both
clauses by the Court that has "constantly narrowed the channel ...
through which any state or federal action must pass in order to survive
constitutional scrutiny." 44 This Part gives a brief history of free exer-
cise jurisprudence illustrating the inherent tension between the relig-
ion clauses.
39 Unsworth, 556 F.3d at 1028 n.9 (Noonan, J., concurring) ("Our disposition of
the vagueness and free speech issues makes it unnecessary for us to address the
Church's additional challenges based on First Amendment rights of association and
free exercise of religion.").
40 Id. at 1035 ("I gladly join the opinion of the court and write here to address
the issue briefed by both parties and not of inconsequential importance: the constitu-
tionality of [MoNr. CODE ANN.] § 13-1-101 et seq. and the regulations thereunder in
the light of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.").
41 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720-21 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 721.
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A. The Sherbert Balancing Test
From 1963 until the Smith decision in 1990, the Supreme Court
used a balancing test established in Sherbert v. Verner45 to determine
whether individuals were entitled to exemptions from laws that bur-
dened their religious conduct. In Sherbert, an employer dismissed a
member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church because she refused to
work on Saturday, her Sabbath. The woman was subsequently unable
to find other employment because of her refusal to work on Satur-
day.46 South Carolina denied her unemployment benefits because
her religious restriction caused her to "fail[ ] . . . to accept available
suitable work when offered."4 7 The Court established a balancing test
between the burden on the plaintiffs religious liberty and any com-
pelling interests the state had for infringing on that interest, 48 and
determined that the plaintiffs free exercise rights were unduly bur-
dened by the state law.49 In 1972, the Supreme Court applied this
balancing test in Wisconsin v. Yoder,50 balancing the right of Amish
parents to direct the education of their children against the state's
interest in supporting universal compulsory education.5' The Court
determined that the exemption the Amish sought was not outweighed
by the state's interest in promoting mandatory education to the age of
sixteen, and granted the exemption.52 Under Sherbert, therefore,
states had to create exemptions from neutral, generally applicable
laws that had an incidental effect of substantially burdening religion if
the state interest was not compelling enough to tip the balance in the
law's favor. Sherbert and Yoder marked "high points" for free exercise
exemptions, however, most religious claimants during this period still
failed to obtain exemptions from burdensome laws when courts
applied the balancing test.58
45 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46 Id. at 399-402.
47 Id. at 401.
48 Id. at 403-09.
49 Id. at 409-10.
50 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51 Id. at 215.
52 Id. at 236 ("[W]eighing the minimal difference between what the State would
require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show
with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education
would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.").
53 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(denying a challenge to the construction of a road through a sacred Indian burial
ground); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying challenge to Social
Security tax by an Amish farmer who claimed that it violated his free exercise rights).
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B. Employment Division v. Smith: Restrictions on Free Exercise
In Employment Division v. Smith,5 4 the Court retreated from the
balancing test applied in Sherbert. In Smith, the state of Oregon
denied two members of the Native American Church unemployment
benefits because their dismissal resulted from their use of an illegal
controlled substance, albeit for sacramental purposes.55 The issue in
the case was the criminalization of peyote without a sacramental
exemption. The Court determined that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).' "56 In the decision upholding the denial of benefits, the
Court held that exemptions should be left to state political processes,
and should not be carved out by the courts.5 7 Smith, however, did
more than outline a new test for infringements on free exercise. It
also implicitly distinguished religious belief from religious action.
The Court stated that the government does not have the power to
control a person's religious beliefs, but the government does have the
authority to regulate religious action.58 The Court expressed fear that
a failure to regulate action would allow every person to "become a law
unto himself," thus creating anarchy.59
Smith remains the test for neutral and generally applicable laws
that have an incidental burden on religion. What if a law is not neu-
tral or generally applicable, however? In Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah,6 0 the Court struck down a city ordinance prohib-
iting the slaughter of animals because the city made exceptions for
many secular killings but not for religious sacrificial killings.61 The
Court stated:
[B]ecause [the ordinance] requires an evaluation of the particular
justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a system of
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the rele-
54 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55 Id. at 874.
56 Id. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3).
57 Id. at 890.
58 Id. at 879 ("'Laws ... are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.'"
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879))). This distinction
between belief and action was actually a return to the pre-Sherbert standard.
59 Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167).
60 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
61 Id. at 521-22 (discussing secular exemptions allowed by the ordinance for
hunting, pest and insect control, and animal population control).
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vant conduct. As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which indi-
vidualized exemptions from a general requirement are available,
the government may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
religious hardship without compelling reason. Respondent's appli-
cation of the ordinance's test of necessity devalues religious reasons
for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious
reasons. Thus religious practice is being singled out for discrimina-
tory treatment.62
In cases where laws target and burden religious conduct, strict
scrutiny applies.6 3 Here, as in most cases where strict scrutiny is
applied, the ordinance failed the test and was struck down. 6 4 Simi-
larly, in Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,65 the Court struck
down a police policy forbidding beards on the police force because it
allowed exceptions for medical reasons but not for religious reasons.6 6
The Court reasoned that the categorical exemption created by
allowing those with skin disorders to keep their beards while prohibit-
ing a similar exemption for those whose faiths required facial hair was
problematic and "sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as
to trigger heightened scrutiny."6 7
Is it plausible, however, to bring state campaign disclosure laws
outside of Smith and protect politically active religious organizations?
How can laws that appear neutral and generally applicable on their
face be subjected to strict scrutiny when they incidentally infringe on
the rights of religious institutions? Part III will outline two possible
ways that state campaign disclosure laws requiring a religious institu-
tion to register as a political committee or lobbyist before speaking
out about a ballot initiative or piece of legislation can be attacked
purely on free exercise grounds and taken outside of the protective
realm of Smith.
III. CAN STATE CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE LAws BE SUBJECTED TO
STRICT SCRUTINY?
After Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws will be upheld
by the courts even if they have an incidental burden on religion.
How, then, can a church successfully attack state campaign disclosure
62 Id. at 537-38 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
63 Id. at 546 ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.").
64 Id. (stating that laws will survive strict scrutiny "only in rare cases").
65 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
66 Id. at 366-67 (explaining that exemptions were allowed for officers who could
not shave daily due to painful skin disorders).
67 Id. at 365.
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laws on free exercise grounds if they apply to all groups and not only
religious organizations? This Part will explore two possible ways to
mount this attack. First, religious organizations may enjoy a right to
institutional free exercise, protecting them from government interfer-
ence and taking them outside the realm of Smith. This special right
for religious organizations recognizes the unique role that they play in
forming individual religious beliefs and in promoting social change
throughout history. Although some scholars argue that this special
right would violate the Establishment Clause by placing religion over
irreligion, the nature of the First Amendment itself, which gives a spe-
cial protection to religion, refutes this idea. Second, state campaign
disclosure laws are not neutral and generally applicable because they
allow exceptions for secular organizations, most notably the press. If
the laws are not neutral and generally applicable, they should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. This Part explores these two ideas and
explains how state campaign disclosure laws should fall outside of the
protection of Smith when applied to religious organizations.
A. Institutional Free Exercise
Some scholars believe that religious organizations should be
granted a special right to institutional free exercise protecting them
from government interference. This right would allow laws burden-
ing religious organizations to circumvent Smith and automatically sub-
ject them to a strict scrutiny analysis. This right would be based on the
unique role of religious organizations in forming individual religious
beliefs and in promoting social change throughout American history.
Scholars who promote institutional free exercise worry that govern-
ment intrusion into the workings of religious organizations will inter-
fere with the belief-formation of individuals and cause society to
stagnate due to the diminished role of religious organizations in polit-
ics. This section discusses this right in greater depth and concludes
that the right to institutional free exercise should protect religious
organizations from certain state campaign disclosure laws.
1. Belief/Action Distinction
In Smith, the Court distinguished between religious action and
religious belief. 68 According to the Court, the government can never
regulate religious belief; however, the government reserves the right
68 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990); see also Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("Government may neither compel affirmation of a
repugnant belief; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because
they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities . . . ." (citations omitted));
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to regulate religious action in order to prevent everyone from becom-
ing a 'law unto himself.'69 The Court has regulated religious action in
many cases. 70 When campaign laws require religious institutions to
register as a political committee or lobbyist before speaking out on
moral issues involved in ballot initiatives or legislation is religious
belief implicated or is this merely a regulation of religious action?
Courts and scholars struggle to make this distinction.71
Bishop William Lori of the Diocese of Bridgeport weighed in on
the debate during the recent controversy in his diocese.72 In his affi-
davit discussing the suit against the Ethics Office of Connecticut,
Bishop Lori said, "[F]rom time to time, the Diocese's religious mis-
sion compels me and the pastors within the Diocese to take stands,
consistent with our religious beliefs, on legislation that concerns the
moral issues of the day."73 He continued that in recent years he "com-
municated with members of the Diocese about a variety of matters
pending in the Connecticut General Assembly that implicate [d] the
teachings of the Church, including gay marriage, the death penalty,
abortion, and other topics" and that he fully expected that his posi-
tion would require him to communicate with his congregation on leg-
BETTE NOVIT EvANs, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 76-97 (1997)
(illustrating two examples of difficult cases dealing with the belief/action distinction).
69 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1879)).
70 See, e.g., id. at 874, 890 (denying an exemption from state law for sacramental
peyote use by members of the Native American Church); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (allowing the Forest Service to
construct a road through sacred Native American land); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 603-05, 609 (1961) (upholding a law forbidding the sale of various retail prod-
ucts on Sunday against challenges by Saturday Sabbath observers).
71 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972) ("[T]he unchallenged testi-
mony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years of
consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating
respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's
requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs."); see also
Gabriel Moens, The Action-Belief Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion, 12 SYDNEY L. REv.
195, 197 (1989) (arguing that the action-belief dichotomy is "conceptually unsound"
as a judicial guideline); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief
Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 500 (1988) ("Many religious doctrines or beliefs dictate stan-
dards of social conduct and responsibility, and require believers to act accordingly.
For those adherents . .. the distinction between religious and political activities may
be artificial.").
72 See supra Part I.A.
73 Affidavit of the Most Reverend William E. Lori at 2, Bridgeport Roman Catho-
lic Diocesan Corp. v. Jones, No. 2009-cv-00851 (D. Conn. May 29, 2009).
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islative matters in the future.7 4 Finally, the Bishop stated that in order
to carry out the Church's religious mission, he and the other leaders
of the diocese "must be free to communicate in an uninhibited man-
ner with [church] members on all matters of faith, regardless of the
extent to which those matters overlap with legislation being consid-
ered by Connecticut's General Assembly" and that "the Diocese and
its parishes cannot fulfill the Church's mission to their fullest extent,
if we cannot use basic tools of communicating with our members."75
It is noteworthy that Bishop Lori framed his duty to discuss important
Catholic moral issues as a matter of fundamental "mission" and "call-
ing," and not merely as voluntary religious action.
Bishop Lori's characterization of his "religious mission" is likely
due to the special part religious institutions play in shaping the relig-
ious beliefs of individuals.76 People go to church to learn about the
central beliefs of their faith and how they can live out these beliefs in
their daily lives. Therefore, if religious institutions are unable to teach
morals and beliefs to their congregations without state interference,
individual belief will be suppressed.77 As Professor Lloyd Mayer states,
74 Id.
75 Id. at 7. The Bishop further stated that he is "required to defend the Church, to
teach on the moral issues of the day and to encourage the lay Catholic faithful to act
on the Church's beliefs in order to form a more just and humane society." Id.
(emphasis added). This statement suggests that communication by the Church hier-
archy encouraging lay Catholics to act is more than mere religious action in itself, but
a fundamental belief of the Church.
76 See DAVID NoVAK, IN DEFENSE OF RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 88 (2009) ("[R]eligious
liberty is the right of a religious community to govern the morality of its members
without any secular coercion."); Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free
Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1675 (arguing for a
broad right of church autonomy due to the unique role of religious organizations in
forming individual religious belief); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards
an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008)
(claiming that religious institutions, like individual believers, should be understood to
possess free exercise rights because of their "infrastructural" role in forming religious
belief). Professor Garnett states, "The freedom of religion is not only lived and exper-
ienced through institutions, it is also protected and nourished by them. Accordingly,
the theories and doctrines we use to understand, apply and enforce the First Amend-
ment's religious-freedom provisions should reflect and respect this fact." Id.
77 See Garnett, supra note 76, at 274; see also NOVAK, supra note 76, at 88
("[F]reedom of religion becomes .. . an 'empty right' if the religious community I
freely choose to join does not have the liberty to morally govern me and my fellow
community members. Therefore, my right of religious freedom presupposes the
communal right of a religious community to exercise its moral authority."); Brady,
supra note 76, at 1677 ("If religious communities are not able to teach, develop, and
live out their ideas free from state interference, individual belief will also be sup-
pressed."); Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibition on Political Cam-
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"[T] he very survival of any particular set of religious beliefs and prac-
tices depends in large part on the ability of such institutions to com-
municate internally without government restriction." 78 Thus, it is
crucial that institutions have the ability to speak out on elements that
are central to their respective faiths, whether or not they overlap with
a proposed piece of legislation or ballot initiative, without govern-
ment interference or regulation.79
Not all scholars and judges believe that churches should enjoy
broad autonomy. As Professor Kathleen Brady, an avid proponent of
church autonomy, notes, "what one observes among the lower courts
is limited protection for religious groups where government regula-
tion burdens religious belief or practice."80 Similarly, Professors Ira
Lupu and Robert Tuttle, while supporting religious group autonomy
on purely religious matters, favor a rule of neutrality that treats relig-
ious and nonreligious groups similarly when their functions are simi-
lar to other nonprofit organizations.81 Therefore, when churches
campaign for or against issues, Lupu and Tuttle prefer that they abide
by the same campaign laws as other nonprofit organizations. Finally,
some scholars deny any special rights to religious organizations. For
example, Marci Hamilton argues that the Smith rule should apply to
all religious organizations, regardless of the nature of their conduct.8 2
As Lupu argued in his earlier works, the conduct of religious organiza-
paign Intervention, 18 STAN L. & POL'Y REv. 298, 311-12 (2007) ("Believers usually do
not settle on a set of favored beliefs and practices and then look for others with a
similar list. Many are born into a faith community, or join one with more questions
than answers. Faith takes shape within the bounds of a particular community . . . .").
78 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and
Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1137, 1207 (2009).
79 See id. at 1209 ("At a minimum ... sermons and similar oral communications
during regular worship services should be protected from the prohibition [on cam-
paign involvement of churches by the IRS]. Other significant channels of internal
religious communications, such as pastoral letters, encyclicals, or other less formal
means of communication should also possibly be covered."). Although Professor
Mayer writes about the application of federal tax laws to religious institutions, his
arguments can be used to defend religious organizations from state campaign laws
that have a chilling effect on religious belief, as well.
80 Brady, supra note 77, at 1655.
81 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 ViLL. L. REv. 37, 78-79, 92 (2002).
82 See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harr Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1099, 1101, 1176-77 ("When it comes to the public good, the
rule of law needs to govern religious institutions, just as it does other private enti-
ties."). Hamilton further argues that protecting the rights of religious organizations
does not necessarily promote the public good because "[t]he needs of religious enti-
ties and the public good are not necessarily equivalent." Id. at 1102.
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tions can have an impact on society at large so exemptions from neu-
tral laws may have a negative impact on society.83 As Professor Brady
states, however, "[r]estrictions on individual action outside the com-
munity may not undermine religious belief . . . but restrictions on
internal group life could be devastating."84 Without freedom from
regulation, religious sects cannot disseminate religious beliefs to both
established congregations and potential converts to the faith in viola-
tion of Smith's protection of religious belief. The Canyon Ferry Road
case and the situation in the Diocese of Bridgeport illustrate the diffi-
culty facing religious organizations in separating religious belief from
political discussion.
2. Religion as a Catalyst for Social Change
The ability to influence politics and policy is, for many faiths, an
essential part of religious practice. 85 For some religions, "political
activity may even be a form of worship."8 6 Campaign disclosure laws
attempting to separate religion into the "actually religious" and the
political create a false dichotomy.8 7 This is due to the fact that
"[r]eligion is not, and has never been, a purely academic exercise,
focused only on scriptural exegeses. It is, and remains, a socially ori-
ented endeavor, which many sects believe requires certain social obli-
gations."8 8  Therefore, for many religions, requiring a religious
83 See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (1987) ("[T]he interests being
protected and enforced in civil rights actions [against religious organizations] are not
only the interests of the parties; substantial public and third-party interests are present
as well.").
84 Brady, supra note 76, at 1676.
85 See Totten, supra note 77, at 312-13 (stating that faith is "intrinsically political"
and that participation in politics can be, for many, as essential as other forms of relig-
ious worship); Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise Clause and the Internal Revenue Code's
Restrictions on the Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
395, 396 (1986) ('Many, if not most, churches and religious groups reject the idea
that religion is limited to the private realm of individual and family experience.
Instead, they believe in the integration of the religious and secular life.").
86 West, supra note 85, at 396.
87 See Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS. Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries
of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 145, 167 (2006) (arguing
that federal tax laws "fundamentally misrepresent what constitutes religious activity").
88 Id. Kemmitt gives many examples throughout history of religion "rais[ing]
society's consciousness" on important issues including: "slavery, taxation, women's
suffrage, prohibition, civil rights, war, weapons of mass destruction, capital punish-
ment, and abortion." Id.; see also OFFICE OF GEN. ASSEMBLY, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
(U.S.A.), GOD ALONE Is LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE 46 (1988) ("[I]t is a limitation and
denial of faith not to seek its expression in both a personal and a public manner, in
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institution to follow difficult procedures before allowing them to
speak about an issue of vital moral importance places a burden on
their communication of religious belief and prohibits them from hav-
ing an impact on the larger society outside of the organization.89
As Professor Brady states:
[A]ny time that government regulation addresses difficult social or
moral issues that also divide church members, the imposition of the
secular standard will disrupt the process by which the religious
group develops its own doctrine and beliefs. Many Americans may
approve of the results in cases where religious groups hold unpopu-
lar or outdated views. However, the First Amendment protects the
freedom of individuals to hold these views, and religious groups are
entitled to the protections that make such freedom possible.90
Many of the "hot-button" political issues today such as same-sex
marriage and abortion go to the heart of religious belief. For many
there is no real way to differentiate between the political nature of
these issues and their deepest religious convictions about the sanctity
of life or the nature of marriage.91 Should pastors or other church
leaders be forced to monitor the newspaper on a daily basis to see if
what they are preaching about happens to coincide with a political
proposal? Is it wise for society to force churches to make this distinc-
tion between faith and politics? The American tradition is fraught
with examples of religious involvement in politics. Abolition,
women's suffrage, prohibition, and the civil rights movement were all
such ways as will not only influence but transform the social order. Faith demands
engagement in the secular order and involvement in the political realm.").
89 Studies monitoring the actual burden placed on an individual or institution by
disclosure laws show that the laws are difficult to follow-in many cases an attorney
would be necessary to successfully navigate the language of the laws-and that the
burden imposed is significant. See JEFFREY MILYO, INST. FOR JUSTICE, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE RED TAPE 1-22 (2007) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE], available at
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/20091007_Milyo2007RedTape.pdf
(reporting that experimental subjects were rated on twenty specific disclosure tasks,
and that on average, only forty-one percent were performed correctly). The study
quoted one participant as saying, "A lawyer would have a hard time wading through
this disclosure mess and we read legal jargon all the time." Id. at 17. This confusing
language would likely have a chilling effect upon the political activism of religious
institutions who-relying largely on monetary donations-are not likely to have the
resources to hire a lawyer each time they wish to speak out on topics of religious and
political importance.
90 Brady, supra note 76, at 1679.
91 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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fueled largely by the involvement of religious organizations. 92 History
suggests that laws chilling religious involvement in politics would
destroy an important source of ideas and change in American
society.9 3
Many state laws chill this activity by threatening penalties for fail-
ing to abide by confusing and wordy campaign disclosure laws.
Twenty-four states allow voters to make laws directly through ballot
measures, and in each of those states a group of more than two citi-
zens who act in support or opposition to a ballot initiative must regis-
ter as a political committee within their state.94 In eight of these
states, there is no floor for the expenditure amount required to trig-
ger the obligation to register as a political committee.9 5 Therefore,
any nominal expenditure by two or more persons in favor of or in
opposition to a ballot measure-including a mere mention of a piece
of moral legislation by a salaried pastor during a regularly scheduled
church service or the use of ink in a church copy machine-would
require them to register as a political committee or be subjected to
possible civil or criminal penalties. Disclosure is very often a difficult
and confusing task. In most states, committees are required to file
disclosure information at various times throughout the year during
nonelection years, and more frequently in the days and months lead-
ing up to an election.9 6 Further, if a contribution meets a certain
threshold amount-which differs from state to state-a political com-
mittee is usually required to submit extensive information about the
donor.9 7 This information is required for every donor who gives a
92 Kemmitt, supra note 87, at 167 (noting the vital role of religion in the defining
political struggles of the last two centuries, including abolition, prohibition, women's
suffrage, and civil rights).
93 See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 250-60 (1998) (dis-
cussing religious involvement in societal change and citing Toqueville's statement
that "religion is America's foremost political institution"); see also Erik J. Ablin, The
Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participation in Political Campaigns,
13 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 571-73 (1999) (outlining the history of
church political involvement); Brady, supra note 76, at 1703 (stating that without the
unorthodox ideas promoted by religion and other minority groups, society will
"stagnate").
94 See CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE, supra note 89, at 2. For general information
about state disclosure laws, see The Campaign Disclosure Project, UCLA ScH. L., http://
disclosure.law.ucla.edu/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
95 See CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE, supra note 89, at 22.
96 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-226 (2009) (requiring different filing dead-
lines for committees supporting candidates for statewide office, local office, and inci-
dental political committees).
97 For an example of burdensome and confusing disclosure requirements, see
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-229. This statute states:
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sum of money greater than the threshold requirement for reporting
contribution information. The committee must also disclose the
names, addresses, and occupations of those to whom expenditures
were made by the committee.98 These rules vary by state, and are usu-
ally difficult to follow.9 9 The complex nature of these laws and the
threat of civil and criminal punishment for incorrectly abiding by
them has a chilling effect on religious organizations that fear punish-
ment and cannot afford hefty fines and expensive litigation. 00
Disclosure of contributions received. Each report required by this chap-
ter shall disclose the following information:
(1) the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting
period;
(2) the full name, mailing address, occupation, and employer, if any, of
each person who has made aggregate contributions, other than loans, of $35
or more to a candidate or political committee, including the purchase of
tickets and other items for events, such as dinners, luncheons, rallies, and
similar fundraising events;
(3) for each person identified under subsection (2), the aggregate
amount of contributions made by that person within the reporting period
and the total amount of contributions made by that person for all reporting
periods;
(4) the total sum of individual contributions made to or for a political
committee or candidate and not reported under subsections (2) and (3);
(5) the name and address of each political committee or candidate
from which the reporting committee or candidate received any transfer of
funds, together with the amount and dates of all transfers;
(6) each loan from any person during the reporting period, together
with the full names, mailing addresses, occupations, and employers, if any, of
the lender and endorsers, if any, and the date and amount of each loan;
(7) the amount and nature of debts and obligations owed to a political
committee or candidate, in the form prescribed by the commissioner;
(8) an itemized account of proceeds that total less than $35 from a per-
son from mass collections made at fundraising events;
(9) each contribution, rebate, refund, or other receipt not otherwise
listed under subsections (2) through (8) during the reporting period;
(10) the total sum of all receipts received by or for the committee or
candidate during the reporting period; and
(11) other information that may be required by the commissioner to
fully disclose the sources of funds used to support or oppose candidates or
issues.
98 See, e.g., id. § 13-37-230(1) (a) (requiring committees to provide the full names,
mailing addresses, occupation, and principal place of business of any person to whom
an expenditure was made during a reporting period as well as the amount, date, and
purpose of each expenditure).
99 See CAMPAIGN FINANCE RED TAPE, supra note 89, at 10-14 (describing the inabil-
ity of regular citizens to fill out disclosure forms correctly in a recent study).
100 See id. at 14-16 (noting that "two-thirds of respondents agreed that the disclo-
sure requirements would deter many people from engaging in independent political
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Although documented instances of retaliation by political opponents
for mistakes on disclosure forms or noncompliance are rare, the Can-
yon Fery Road case and the Diocese of Bridgeport are prime examples
of what is at stake. Due to the divisive nature of the issues and their
level of influence on congregants, the threat of retaliation is increased
for religious organizations. Therefore, confusing compliance laws
may lock the lips of religious organizations, religious leaders, and
church groups because they fear civil penalties and lack the resources
to hire a lawyer every time they would like to participate in political
dialogue.101 This "chilling effect" is a burden on the free exercise of
religion, as fundamental beliefs of religious organizations are silenced
and are not passed down to congregations where individual belief is
formed.10 2 Equally troubling, however, is the potential stifling of one
of America's most consistent sources of positive social change and the
implications for American democracy.103
3. Institutional Free Exercise and Smith
Due to the unique role of religious organizations in forming indi-
vidual belief and promoting positive change within society throughout
history, Smith should not serve as the guidepost for assessing the free
exercise rights of religious institutions. Instead, institutional free
exercise should give a right of autonomy to religious organizations
and prevent laws that have the incidental effect of burdening religion
from applying in the communal setting. 104 Although the Supreme
activity," and that figure increased to nearly 90% when participants were reminded of
possible fines and punishment associated with noncompliance or mistakes on forms).
101 SeeAppellants' Reply Brief, supra note 38, at 29 (stating that the burden requir-
ing churches to register with the state "is substantial ... any time it exercises a core
value of its faith by supporting or opposing a ballot issue that implicates its moral
doctrines").
102 See Kemmitt, supra note 87, at 169; see also Part III.A.1 (explaining the vital role
that religious institutions play in forming individual religious belief).
103 See Brady, supra note 76, at 1700 ("Religious groups are among the 'mediating
structures' or institutions of 'civil society' that stand between the individual and the
state and transmit the values, skills, and attitudes necessary for self-government."
(footnote omitted)); Garnett, supra note 76, at 294-95 (arguing that religious institu-
tions do not only benefit from, but also help protect religious freedom).
104 See Brady, supra note 76, at 1672-79; Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits
on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 347,
347-52, 379-420 (1984) (using the Establishment Clause to justify the institutional
exception); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1392 (1981) ("The free exercise clause . . . forbids government interference with
church operations unless there is ... a compelling governmental interest to justify the
interference."); Mayer, supra note 78, at 1197-1216 (arguing that institutional free
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Court has never addressed the free exercise rights of religious institu-
tions, it seems likely that the Court will in the future.
But would Smith really permit institutional free exercise? Accord-
ing to Professors Brady and Mayer, the answer is yes.105 First, Smith
creates a distinction between belief and action, as described above,
forbidding the regulation of religious beliefs by the government.106 If
the religious institution is viewed as the place where individual relig-
ious beliefs are formed, then government interference with the forma-
tion of these beliefs would likely be prohibited by Smith as well. As
Brady states, "If religious groups play an essential role in shaping indi-
vidual religious belief and, indeed, in the very formulation of religious
ideas, the freedom of belief that Smith envisions requires protections
for religious organizations."' 0 7 Further, the decision in Smith did not
state that religion and irreligion must always be treated alike. Instead,
the decision encouraged individual state legislatures to make exemp-
tions protecting religion on their own. The opinion stated,
[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its
legislation as well. . . . But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-
practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to
say that it is constitutionally required .... .0o
Therefore, one who argues that religion should never be granted an
exemption from a neutral law may be reading too far into Smith and
distorting free exercise jurisprudence. Even after Smith, exemptions
can still be made for religion even if they are not required, and
according to the Court these exemptions may even be desirable.
exercise should protect sermons and other internal religious communication from
IRS tax laws).
105 See generally Brady, supra note 76 (arguing for a broad right of institutional free
exercise protection); Mayer, supra note 78 (advocating free exercise protection for
internal church communication with congregations). But cf Hamilton, supra note
82, at 1110 (stating that allowing a right to church autonomy would prevent the gov-
ernment from protecting the common good by "permit[ting] religious entities to
avoid being legally accountable for the harm they have caused"). Hamilton goes on
to state that "'[c]hurch autonomy' is not and should not be a doctrine recognized in
the United States." Id. at 1112; see also Lupu, supra note 83, at 408-09 (explaining
that it is unnecessary to give churches broad autonomy in many cases because the
court can use "neutral principles of law" to resolve intrachurch disputes and that it is
unconstitutional to grant churches complete autonomy because church decisions
affect society outside of the church community).
106 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
107 Brady, supra note 76, at 1677.
108 Smith, 494 U.S at 890; see also Brady, supra note 76, at 1674 (explaining that
Smith allows for legislative accommodation of religion when permissible).
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Next, given the positive role that churches historically played in
promoting societal change, 09 it is necessary to protect their ability to
speak out on matters of political importance. Exempted religious
organizations do not threaten the anarchy discussed in Smith in the
same way that exempted individuals do."i0 Although Professor Lupu
may disagree, the fear that a church member would "by virtue of his
beliefs . . . become a law unto himself' by speaking out on political
issues is minimal."' The role of the religious institution is shaping
the beliefs of its followers based on church doctrine. The individual's
ability to become politically active and impact society based on these
acquired beliefs is entirely within the rights of the individual as an
American citizen and is not threatening to American democracy.
While some opponents may disagree, it matters little to the political
process whether one forms their political beliefs at church or by
watching CNN. Therefore, a citizen choosing to exercise their politi-
cal rights based on a religious belief does not threaten society and its
laws in the same way as granting every individual an exemption to a
drug law for religious purposes. 12 This holds true even if the relig-
ious belief is unpopular. 1 3 As Brady states:
109 See, e.g., Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556
F.3d 1021, 1036 (9th Cir. 2009) (Noonan, J., concurring) ("Churches have played an
important-no, an essential-part in the democratic life of the United States.");
Ablin, supra note 93, at 571-73 ("The practice of churches and clergy engaging in
political rhetoric and activity is something that predates the Constitution." (citations
omitted)).
110 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (suggesting that allowing exemptions to individuals
based on religious beliefs would be "courting anarchy").
111 Id. at 885; see Brady, supra note 76, at 1677-78 (discussing the minimal threat
to society posed by internal church decisions such as the hiring and firing of minis-
ters). But see Lupu, supra note 83, at 408-09 (stating that the effects of certain civil
rights violations by churches are not confined only to church communities but affect
society as a whole). While it is true that the individual political involvement of church
members may impact society outside of the religious organization, the actual forma-
tion of individual belief within the church community is protected under Smith and
should not be regulated by the government. See Brady, supra note 77, at 1677 ("[Tlhe
same danger [of anarchy discussed in Smith] does not arise when religious organiza-
tions are exempted from compliance with regulations that interfere with internal com-
munity life." (emphasis added)).
112 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
113 See Brady, supra note 76, at 1703 ("Where government regulation inhibits the
preservation, transmission, and development of minority beliefs within religious com-
munities and other civic groups, it disserves democracy, not serves it. Full freedom of
belief, even unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of democratic
society as are the groups that make such beliefs possible.").
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Democratic government is not supported best by homogeneity of
beliefs and values, even beliefs whose correctness seems unassailable
and values that seem essential for democratic life. Shaping associa-
tional life so that the internal practices and values of religious
groups and other mediating institutions match shared public norms
stifles new ideas that could challenge prevailing perspectives in pro-
gressive directions. 114
Some scholars argue that allowing for a broad right of church
autonomy would violate the Establishment Clause by giving preferen-
tial treatment to religion.1 1 5 As William Marshall explained, free exer-
cise exemptions may violate the Establishment Clause because
"[s]pecial treatment for religion connotes sponsorship and endorse-
ment; providing relative benefits for religion over non-religion may
have the impermissible effect of advancing religion."1 16 Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock'17 demon-
strated this idea by striking down a Texas sales tax exemption for
religious publications. The Court held that "Texas' sales tax exemp-
tion for periodicals published or distributed by a religious faith and
consisting wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith
lacks sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause. Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy."11 8 Similarly, anti-
accommodation scholars argue that a right granting religious institu-
tions exemptions from neutral laws violates the Establishment Clause
because it singles out religion and confers a benefit on religious orga-
nizations. 119 This is not the case, however. Professor Brady argued,
for example, "the very existence of constitutional provisions dedicated
exclusively to religion demonstrate that religion is distinctive in our
constitutional framework."1 20 Therefore, accommodations for relig-
114 Id.
115 See IsAAc KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 15
(1996); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1248
(1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 452-60 (1994); William P. Mar-
shall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308, 319-23
(1991) [hereinafter Marshall, In Defense of Smith]; William P. Marshall, The Case Against
the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 357, 390-92
(1989).
116 Marshall, In Defense of Smith, supra note 115, at 320 (citations omitted).
117 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
118 Id. at 14.
119 See supra note 115.
120 See Brady, supra note 77, at 1711; see also NovAK, supra note 77, at 89 ("A
democracy need only ensure that no adult citizen has his or her privacy invaded by
any religion without his or her consent."); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
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ion are not unconstitutional. To the contrary, in Smith, the Court
encouraged legislative accommodations for religion.121 Further, in
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,' 22 the
Court stated that "it has never indicated that statutes that give special
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid."' 23 Instead,
"[w] here, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting
a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to
require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular
entities."124 As Professor McConnell notes, "It is not credible to argue
that accommodation of religion violates the First Amendment on the
ground that it protects religion and not other institutions and systems
of belief, because the same argument could be made against the First
Amendment itself."1 25
It follows, then, that institutional free exercise is consistent with
Smith in preserving the freedom of individual religious belief, while
protecting the order and stability of American democracy. 126 There-
fore, the right of institutions to form religious beliefs, whether or not
they coincide with political matters or agree with societal norms,
should be protected from the chilling effect of state disclosure laws.
B. Are Campaign Disclosure Laws Generally Applicable?
The central holding in Smith states that a neutral law of general
applicability that incidentally burdens religion is not necessarily
unconstitutional because it proscribes certain religious action.127 But
how does one tell whether a law is neutral or generally applicable?
On the surface, it may not be readily apparent. For example, selective
or discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral laws can subject
them to strict scrutiny.128 Further, recent case law suggests that when
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 718 (1992)
("[I]f extending special constitutional protection to free exercise advances religion,
then the Religion Clauses are contradictory . . . .").
121 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("[T]o say that a nondis-
criminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is
not to say that it is constitutionally required . . .
122 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
123 Id. at 338.
124 Id.; see also Brady, supra note 76, at 1712 (refuting the argument that religious
accommodations are a violation of the Establishment Clause).
125 See McConnell, supra note 120, at 720.
126 See Brady, supra note 76, at 1672-79.
127 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
128 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167-68 (3d Cir.
2002) (finding that Ordinance 691 was not generally applicable because of its "selec-
tive, discretionary application" that singled out religiously motivated conduct).
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exemptions from the law are granted for secular reasons but not for
religious reasons, the law may be underinclusive-and thus not gener-
ally applicable. 129
State campaign disclosure laws appear neutral. Indeed, they do
not impose disclosure requirements only on religious organizations,
but rather require many groups advocating for or against a ballot initi-
ative or piece of legislation to register as a political committee. Based
on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lukumi, however, state cam-
paign disclosure laws are not generally applicable because they allow
exemptions for secular purposes. For example, as noted in the Can-
yon Ferry Road case, the Montana Code allows exemptions for
(i) services provided without compensation by individuals vol-
unteering a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or
political committee or meals and lodging provided by individuals in
their private residences for a candidate or other individual;
(ii) the cost of any bona fide news story, commentary, or edito-
rial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication of general
circulation;
(iii) the cost of any communication by any membership organi-
zation or corporation to its members or stockholders or employees;
or
(iv) filing fees paid by the candidate.1 30
Similarly, most other states allow some exemptions from their report-
ing requirements including an exemption for media and news
organizations. 131
In his concurrence in Canyon Ferry Road, Judge Noonan
addressed these exceptions for media outlets and argued that they
129 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993); Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209-14 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that
a law prohibiting the ownership of wildlife without paying for a permit was not gener-
ally applicable because zoos and circuses did not have to meet this requirement while
a Lakota Indian did have to pay to keep animals for religious reasons); Fraternal
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
police regulation forbidding beards was not generally applicable because it allowed
an exemption for medical reasons but not religious reasons).
130 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-101(7) (b) (i)-(iv) (2009).
131 See, e.g., Amuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-901(8)(a) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-
601b(5) (2009); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 169.206(c)(2)(d) (West 2005); MINN.
STAT. § 10A.01 Subds. 9(3) & 21(7) (2008); Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.011(16)(e)(a)
(2008); OR. REv. STAT. § 260.007(1) (2007); WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.020(15) (b) (iv)
(2008).
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destroy the laws' general applicability. 1 3 2 He noted that the "media
are free to promote political opinions without registering as indepen-
dent political committees and without disclosing the identity of those
owning the facilities used to promote the opinions."1 3 3 Due to this
exception, he stated that the most influential source of information in
the political process is removed from regulation by the disclosure stat-
ute, and therefore the "generality of the statute is destroyed."134 In an
era when the bipartisanship and neutrality of many media organiza-
tions is challenged,13 5 and when media outlets become more and
more influential in forming the political views of Americans, allowing
the press an exemption from reporting requirements threatens to
undermine the stated purpose of campaign disclosure laws in prevent-
ing corruption and educating the public about the use of money on
political matters.
Judge Noonan anticipates the counterargument to his opinion-
that exempting the press from such disclosure requirements is neces-
sary because its freedom is protected by the First Amendment and
because "[a]n unregulated, unregistered press is important to our
democracy." 3 6 In response to this argument, however, he states that
both freedom of the press and freedom of religion are protected by
the First Amendment and that they should be treated similarly.137 In
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,13 8 the Supreme Court stated that the pulpit
holds a "high estate" under the First Amendment, just like freedom of
132 Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d
1021, 1035-37 (9th Cir. 2009) (NoonanJ., concurring).
133 Id. at 1035.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Neutralizing the Opposition, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/22/AR2009102
200951.html (discussing President Obama's attack on Fox News and allegations that
Fox is an "opinion outfit" and not a "news network"); Brian Stelter, Fox's Volley with
Obama Intensifying, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2009, at Bi (same); Press Release, Ctr. for
Media and Pub. Affairs, George Mason Univ., Obama Leads the Media Race as Well
(Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.cmpa.com/media-room-press_8.htm
(reporting on a study showing that the media favored Barack Obama and that com-
ments about Obama on the evening news were sixty-five percent positive compared to
only thirty-six percent positive about Senator McCain).
136 Unsworth, 556 F.3d at 1036 (Noonan, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 1035 ("But if it is obvious that the freedom of the press would be
infringed by the statute's requirements, is it not equally obvious that the free exercise
of religion is burdened by them?"); see also Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 38, at
31 ("[W]hile the state aggressively defends the freedom of the press, it aggressively
prosecutes the free exercise of religion.").
138 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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the press.' 3 9 As the appellants in the Canyon Ferry Road case stated in
their reply brief, campaign disclosure laws are
truly unconscionable, given that the press and pulpit have remarka-
bly similar characteristics: the same First Amendment protects both;
their expression (editorial or evangelical) is inherently public; and
both are commonly acknowledged as being a community's voice. In
broad constitutional terms, the only real difference is that one
speaks from a secular viewpoint, while the other offers a religious
viewpoint.14o
Further, like an unregulated press, unregulated and politically
involved religious institutions are crucial to democracy in the United
States. 14 1 As stated previously, the active involvement of churches in
the political process is responsible for much positive social change in
the United States throughout history.14 2 To speak of the contribu-
tions of a free press without mentioning the contributions of politi-
cally active churches is to only tell half of the story of positive change
in the United States since its founding.
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Lukumi, it is difficult to
argue that state disclosure laws allowing exceptions for the press, as
well as for other secular situations, are generally applicable. Surely if a
pastor's salary or the cleaning costs associated with running a church
are counted as a political expenditure,1 4 3 then the salary of an edito-
rial journalist or the costs of cleaning a newspaper office or news sta-
tion should be included, as well. Why the variation of treatment
between First Amendment freedoms? Because these laws are not gen-
erally applicable in practice, they lie outside of Smith and should be
subjected to strict scrutiny.
IV. COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTEREST?
If the previous arguments succeed and institutional free exercise
or press exemptions bring state registration and disclosure laws
outside of Smith, what happens next? States could still survive strict
139 Id. at 109.
140 Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 38, at 32.
141 See supra Part III.A.2; see also Garnett, supra note 76, at 294 ("[T]he claims
developed in the context of the Free Speech Clause, with respect to the need for
institution-sensitive doctrine, apply in the Religion Clauses context as well.").
142 See Unsworth, 556 F.3d at 1036-37 (Noonan, J., concurring) (noting that the
end of slavery and the civil rights movement were both achieved largely due to the
involvement of religious institutions); Kemmit, supra note 87, at 167 (recalling the
contribution of religious organizations to the abolition of slavery, the women's suf-
frage movement, the Civil Rights Movement, etc.).
143 See Summary of Facts, supra note 30, at 1, 9.
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scrutiny by proving that the laws are narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling government interest.1 44 However, when religious organiza-
tions speak out on ballot initiatives or pending legislation, forcing
them to register as a political committee or lobbyist does not serve a
compelling government interest and should fail a strict scrutiny analy-
sis. This Part will examine states' purported interests in campaign dis-
closure laws and argue that these interests-especially the need to
prevent corruption-are not served by forcing churches to register as
a political committee when speaking out on a ballot initiative or piece
of legislation.
A. The Purposes of Registration and Disclosure
The central case defining the government's interests in requiring
disclosure is Buckley v. Valeo.145 In that case, the Court outlined three
governmental interests vindicated by requiring disclosure: (1) provid-
ing the electorate with information as to where campaign money
comes from and how it is spent by the candidate; (2) deterring cor-
ruption and avoiding the appearance of corruption; and (3) record-
ing records for the purpose of preventing candidates from going over
their contribution limits. 146 However, in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti,147 the Court stated that these concerns were greatly dimin-
ished when dealing with a state referendum instead of a specific can-
didate for office. The Court explained, "the risk of corruption
perceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present
in a popular vote on a public issue."148 Similarly, the other two pur-
144 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state mayjustify
an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing some compelling state interest."); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Chey-
enne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[I]f a law that burdens a religious practice
is not neutral or generally applicable, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the burden on
religious conduct violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment unless it is
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest."). There are some
cases, however, when even a compelling government interest may not allow the gov-
ernment to interfere with religion. For example, it is doubtful that the government
could change the words to, say, the Apostle's Creed or the Lord's Prayer even if they
had a compelling state interest to do so. Changing elements of religion central to
religious belief would likely run afoul of the "excessive entanglement" prong of the
Lemon test and violate the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 607-09 (1971).
145 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
146 Id. at 66-68.
147 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
148 Id. at 790 (citations omitted); see also Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (N.D. Fla. 1978) ("[I]n the context of an issue campaign and election, if
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poses outlined in Buckley are not severely implicated by a ballot initia-
tive or other forms of issue advocacy. 149
In McConnell v. FEC,150 the Supreme Court considered a chal-
lenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).15 1 In
part, this Act attempted to deal with "issue ads." Corporations used
these ads to speak out against policies of specific candidates without
expressly telling the audience how to vote to circumvent the federal
restrictions on express candidate advocacy.152 The plaintiffs in this
case challenged the BCRA claiming that Buckley drew a distinction
between express candidate advocacy and issue advocacy.15 3 The Court
stated that the distinction drawn in Buckley was merely an attempt to
"avoid constitutional infirmities" 154 and they disagreed that "the First
Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-
called issue advocacy."15 5 In his dissenting opinion, however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist claimed that the BCRA was overbroad and regulated
too much speech "that has no plausible connection to candidate con-
tributions or corruption." 5 6 The Court found that this distinction
failed to aid the legislative goals of preventing corruption and that the
BCRA helped fill loopholes in order to do so. Finally, in 2007 the
there is to be one, the threat of corruption is minimal at best and is not sufficiently
compelling to sustain this ceiling on contributions as it applies to plaintiff."). But see
Bemis Pentecostal Church v. State, 731 S.W.2d 897, 901-06 (Tenn. 1987) (discussing
the increasing prevalence of interest groups and the need for checks on political
expenditures even for referenda).
149 In issue campaigns, the interest in preventing candidates from going over cam-
paign monetary limits is nonapplicable. Further, the interest in providing the electo-
rate with information on who supports or opposes a ballot measure would not be
severely inhibited if religious organizations were no longer made to abide by confus-
ing disclosure laws that chill their political speech. Instead, voters would still have
information about which nonreligious organizations supported or opposed a mea-
sure, and religious organizations would have more opportunities to make their views
known without fearing civil or criminal punishment. Therefore, the public would still
enjoy access to this information.
150 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
151 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-457
(2006)).
152 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126 (defining "issue ads" as advertisements containing
"magic words" like "Vote Against Jane Doe" while specifically intending to influence
elections).
153 Id. at 190; see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (including examples
of words suggesting express advocacy: "vote for," "elect," "support," and "defeat,"
which gave rise to the "magic words" requirement).
154 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192.
155 Id. at 193 ("Buckley's magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless.").
156 Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2061
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court revisited the BCRA in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,157
and determined that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the
specific facts of that case since the ads in question "may reasonably be
interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate" and therefore they were not "the functional
equivalent of express advocacy."15 8 The Court stated that challenges
to the BCRA must be objective and consider the substance of the elec-
tioneering communication, however the intent and effect of the com-
munication should not be considered.15 9 The test outlined by the
Court states that "a court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no rea-
sonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate." 60 Since the Wisconsin Right to Life ads were not
deemed a form of express advocacy, the Court found that the state
had no compelling interest in regulating them because there was a
diminished fear of corruption.16 1 Similarly, state laws that require
registration and disclosure when churches advocate for or against a
ballot initiative or piece of legislation do not serve a compelling state
interest. Therefore, these laws would fail a strict scrutiny analysis.
B. Issue v. Candidate Advocacy
Scholars struggle to draw a distinction between issue and candi-
date advocacy to determine when organizations are required to regis-
ter and disclose political expenditures.162 It becomes increasingly
difficult to draw a line between issue and candidate advocacy because
issues often define candidates. For example, in the 2008 election, it
was clear that Senator John McCain was against abortion while then-
Senator Barack Obama was prochoice. During the election, then, if a
church preached support of a prolife message, could they be said to
157 551 U.S. 449 (2007). For a history of the jurisprudence leading up to and
including Wisconsin Right to Life, see Robert L. Kerr, Considering the Meaning ofWiscon-
sin Right to Life for the Corporate Free-Speech Movement, 14 COMM. L. & POL'Y 105,
123-29 (2009).
158 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 451.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 478-79. The Court stated that the Wisconsin Right to Life ads were con-
sistent with issue ads because they took a position on a legislative issue and urged the
public to adopt the same position and contact their legislators. On the other hand,
the Court listed indicia of express advocacy ads that "mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger" or take a "position on a candidate's character, qualifica-
tions, or fitness for office." Id. at 451-52.
162 See, e.g., Ablin, supra note 93, at 577-79 ("[T]he line between advocating issues
and candidates is a rather murky one.").
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endorse John McCain? The same problems exist on the state level, as
prolife and prochoice candidates, and those that are for and against
legalizing same-sex marriage, often divide the electorate along relig-
ious lines. The main reason for the distinction between candidates
and issues, as discussed above, is that there is an increased danger of
corruption when specific candidates are involved as opposed to a
mere ballot measure or piece of legislation.
But how do you make a meaningful distinction between the two?
Is the answer a "magic words" test outlined in Buckley,163 and referred
to again in Wisconsin Right to Life?164 Should the intent of the commu-
nication be considered? The most workable solution to this problem
is to consider the communication on a case-by-case basis using "magic
words" as a guideline, but not as a strict per se rule. For example,
church communications urging their congregation to vote for a par-
ticular candidate would clearly be candidate-centered "express advo-
cacy" and would require the church to register as a political
committee under state election laws serving the compelling state
interest of battling corruption. Issue advocacy, however, should be
interpreted broadly to encompass ballot initiatives, opposition to or
support of legislation, campaigns urging congregations to contact
elected officials, etc. This is due to the diminished threat of corrup-
tion involved in these cases and the fact that the other concerns dis-
cussed in Buckley are also less applicable when a candidate is not
involved. As Chief Justice Roberts outlined in Wisconsin Right to Life,
"a court should find that an ad [or, in this case, an election communi-
cation] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate."165 This presumption for issue advocacy
would give broad protection to the free exercise rights of religious
institutions in speaking out on political issues that touch on core relig-
ious beliefs, while also protecting the interest of the state in prevent-
ing corruption in candidate elections.
State laws that force religious institutions to register as political
committees or lobbyists when speaking out on moral issues that coin-
cide with legislation or ballot initiatives do not serve a compelling
state interest and would therefore fail a strict scrutiny analysis.
163 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976).
164 Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 474 n.7. For a more detailed discussion of
the "magic words" requirement, see Richard E. Levy, Defining Express Advocacy for Pur-
poses of Campaign Finance Reporting and Disclosure Laws, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 90,
99-104 (1999), advocating against the use of the "magic words" doctrine and sug-
gesting that the "purpose and effect" of the ad should be considered.
165 Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added).
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Although distinguishing between candidate-centered express advo-
cacy and more general issue advocacy has been difficult for courts, in
the wake of Wisconsin Right to Life, there should be a presumption
against express candidate advocacy unless that purpose is readily clear
to the reasonable observer from the face of the specific
communication.
Due to the diminished government interest in preventing corrup-
tion in instances of issue advocacy, and the fact that donation informa-
tion about nonreligious organizations and many individuals would still
be readily available to voters, state campaign registration and disclo-
sure laws that require religious organizations to register as a political
committee or lobbyist before speaking about moral issues embedded
in legislation should fail a strict scrutiny test.
CONCLUSION
Requiring churches to register as a political committee or a lob-
byist when speaking out about legislation or a ballot initiative
encroaches on the ability of religious organizations to freely discuss
matters central to their faiths and is a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. Although cases of this nature have
traditionally been decided on free speech grounds, it should be
remembered that religious liberty is an equally important "first free-
dom" that is worth protecting from intrusive government regulation.
Therefore, a hybrid claim of action is not necessary to protect relig-
ious freedom in these cases. Instead, state campaign laws requiring
church registration can be attacked on two grounds-as a violation of
institutional free exercise and because they often allow exceptions
destroying their general applicability. A statement from Bishop Wil-
liam E. Lori of the Diocese of Bridgeport, Connecticut about Legisla-
tive Bill No. 1098 is particularly applicable to this discussion: "It is up
to us to stop this unbridled abuse of governmental power. It is time
for us to defend our First Amendment rights. It is time for us to
defend our Church!"166





PUBLISHED BY THE NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
COPYRIGHT2010 UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
2065

